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Although the use of multiple methods of user authentication for IT system increases security, passwords are often the only 
credential required for access. Consequently, the challenge is to discover ways to improve password strength without impairing 
usability. Longer pass “phrases” have received increased attention as a solution to this challenge because they are potentially 
more resistant to attacks yet are easy to remember. Recent evidence, however, suggests that passphrases increase the likelihood 
of typographical errors resulting in login failures and negative user perceptions. This paper presents experimental results that 
demonstrate well-designed passphrases do not increase login failures and, thereby, generate positive user perceptions. 
Implications are drawn to help IT managers develop effective IT security policies in utilizing passphrases to improve authentication 
and to assist researchers in identifying avenues for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
IT security could be enhanced by using multiple methods to authenticate users, such as combining 
“something you know” (e.g., a password) with “something you have” (e.g., a smartcard or token) and 
“something you are” (e.g., a biometric characteristic). Although the use of biometrics and smartcards 
is growing, passwords are still the most common, and sometimes the only authentication mechanism 
used by many organizations (Whitman, 2003). Therefore, it is important to find ways to improve 
password effectiveness.  
 
To be effective as an authentication mechanism, passwords must simultaneously satisfy two 
conflicting requirements: they must be difficult to compromise, yet easy to remember. This challenge 
underscores the importance of considering user behavior when developing security solutions. If users 
are allowed to create their own passwords, they tend to use common words, names, dates, or other 
personal information that can be easily remembered (Brown et al., 2004). Such passwords, however, 
can also be easily guessed by attackers with knowledge about their intended victim. In addition, user-
generated passwords are often easy to compromise by various types of permutation attacks that use 
pre-compiled dictionaries or word-lists (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2005). If organizations attempt to 
mitigate this threat either by developing strict guidelines for creating passwords or by assigning users 
system-generated passwords that are comprised of random characters, users can find such complex 
passwords difficult to remember (Yan et al., 2004). Therefore, they often write the password down and 
store it insecurely (e.g., by attaching it to the monitor or placing it under the keyboard). Even if users 
store the written-down password securely (e.g., in their wallets), doing so changes it from being 
“something you know” to “something you have,” thereby reducing the number of different 
authentication factors being used.   
 
Switching from passwords to passphrases may provide a solution to this security vs. “memorability” 
predicament. Passphrases are long passwords created from multiple words to form a phrase (e.g., “I 
love to eat chocolate chip cookies”). The idea of using passphrases is not new (cf Porter, 1982), but 
until recently most systems have restricted password length to eight characters, making the use of 
longer passphrases infeasible. Now, many online authentication schemes and newer versions of both 
Windows and Mac operating systems support the use of much longer passwords, and security 
professionals recommend replacing passwords with passphrases (Burnett, 2005; Center for Internet 
Security, 2004, Section 2.2.2.4; Johansson and Riley, 2005, p. 345; Skoudis and Liston, 2006, p. 
402). Passphrases are attractive because there is evidence that they are as easy to remember as 
user-generated passwords (Keith et al., 2007; Yan et al., 2004), yet are potentially more resistant to 
compromise than system-generated passwords (Burnett, 2005; Johansson, 2004c). Passphrases 
also increase the effectiveness of behavioral biometric tools like keystroke analysis in distinguishing 
between different people entering the same data (Huston, 2006). Thus, passphrases may not only be 
inherently more secure than passwords, but may also improve the joint level of security when used as 
part of a multi-factor authentication scheme. 
 
Recent research, however, reveals a potential drawback to passphrases: increased typographic 
errors (Keith et al., 2007). Such errors not only result in more login failures but also negatively affect 
such user perceptions as ease-of-use. User perceptions are important because they can influence 
willingness to comply with the organization’s security policies. If users decide not to comply with 
security policies that are perceived as being onerous and counterproductive, the overall level of 
security declines.  Therefore, it is important to investigate whether switching from passwords to 
passphrases merely replaces one trade-off between security and usability with another. 
 
This study reports the results of a 12-week field experiment that investigated whether passphrases 
can be constructed in a manner that makes them both more effective and easier to use than strong 
passwords. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the 
theoretical foundation for our research design and develops our hypotheses. Then we describe our 
research methodology and the experimental task, and present our results. We discuss the 
implications of those results, including the limitations of the study, before we conclude this paper. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Prior research on passwords has primarily focused on technical issues, particularly how the 
characteristics of the “something you know” credential affect its strength and ease of recall (e.g., 
Morris and Thompson, 1979; Pond et al., 2000; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005, Zviran and Haga, 1990). 
Password strength refers to its resistance to both guessing and “cracking” attacks. Guessing attacks 
are online: The perpetrator tries repeatedly to log in to the target account by trying various passwords. 
The likelihood of an attacker successfully guessing a user’s password can be significantly reduced by 
enforcing policies about minimum password length, required frequency of changing, and the 
maximum number of attempted logins permitted before the account is locked. Proper policies, 
combined with periodic examination of logs to identify excessive failed attempts to log in to specific 
accounts, should make guessing attacks unlikely to succeed (Johansson and Riley, 2005, p. 327).  
On the other hand, password cracking involves stealing a copy of the encrypted or hashed password 
file, or capturing the challenge-response sequence, and attempting to create strings that match the 
captured credentials (Johansson, 2004a).1 Precompiled hash files exist for words in almost every 
language; therefore, “cracking” any password that is contained in such a list is a relatively trivial task. 
Such dictionary attacks can be thwarted, however, by “salting” passwords with additional random text 
prior to hashing. Salted passwords and passwords comprised of random sequences of characters 
can only be cracked by brute force enumeration of every possible combination of allowable 
characters. Password strength, in terms of resistance to such brute force enumeration attacks, is a 
function of the size of the search space, which can be calculated by the formula nL, where n 
represents the size of the allowable character set that is used to create the password (or passphrase) 
and L represents its length. Thus, increasing the length L of a password/passphrase exponentially 
increases the size of the search space. If the distribution of passwords or passphrases within the 
potential search space is uniform, attackers would need to enumerate, on average, one-half of the 
possibilities to successfully guess the login credential. 
 
This nL formula suggests that longer passphrases should be much stronger than fixed-length system-
generated random passwords. The formula, however, assumes that each character is randomly 
chosen with equal probability. This assumption is not likely to hold for user-generated passwords and 
passphrases. For example, because passphrases consist of words, there are certain patterns of letter 
sequences (e.g., in English the letter q is almost certain to be followed by the letter u, sequences of 
three or more consecutive vowels are highly unlikely, etc.). As such, entropy is a better measure of 
password strength than simple length and character set, because it also takes into account the 
probability with which each individual character is chosen (Johansson, 2004b). Entropy is a measure 
of the randomness of a password; the more random the sequence of characters, the higher the 
entropy of a password and the more resistant it is to cracking. There is no universal agreement on 
how to calculate the entropy of user-generated passwords and passphrases. Nevertheless, even 
conservative calculations indicate that well-designed passphrases are likely to have higher entropy 
(i.e., be more resistant to brute-force guessing attacks) than eight-character system-generated 
passwords that represent truly random sequences of symbols2 (Johansson, 2004b; Johansson, 
2004c). 
 
The nL formula may also have to be adjusted for passphrases to reflect the fact that the relevant unit 
                                                     
1 Theft of the password hash file means that the attacker has already compromised at least one machine. Cracking 
the password file enables the attacker to continue to access the system in a manner that is difficult to track (i.e., by 
logging in as a legitimate user). In addition, because users often use the same credential on multiple systems, 
cracking passwords on one system may enable attackers to successfully jump to other targets.   
2 For example, a common measure of entropy is log (base 2) of character set size (Johansson, 2004b). Passphrases 
consisting of 26 alphabetic characters plus the following 13 special characters enclosed in brackets [.,;:?”’()-!$%] and 
the space bar total 40 potential characters resulting in 5.3 bits of entropy per character (log(base2) of 40). Hence, a 
three-word (approx. 16 characters) passphrase consisting of the above 40 characters has about 84.8 bits of entropy 
(16 characters x 5.3 bits). In comparison, a completely random password has 6.6 bits of entropy per character 
(log(base2) of 95 possible characters). Therefore, an eight-character random password has only 52.8 bits of entropy 
(8 characters x 6.6 bits) compared to 84.8 for a passphrase. 
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of analysis is words, rather than characters.3 Thus for passphrases, the character set size n is the 
size of the average user’s vocabulary and L is the number of words used in the passphrase. 
Estimates of the size of an average adult’s vocabulary vary dramatically, ranging from a few thousand 
to more than 50,000 words (Crystal, 2003; Wren, 2003). As was the case with entropy, however, even 
the most conservative estimates of vocabulary size indicate an advantage for passphrases over 
random system-generated passwords that contain a mix of alphanumeric and special characters. For 
example, a five-word passphrase drawn from a conservative vocabulary set of 3,000 words is more 
resistant to brute-force enumeration than an eight-character random system-generated password, 
and an eight-word passphrase is as strong as a 14-character random system-generated password. 
 
However, technology and behavior are inseparable in information systems (Hevner et al., 2004). 
Password security is, thus, as much a behavioral issue as a technical one. Users adapt their 
behaviors to requirements imposed by a system, and they also attempt to modify or alter aspects of 
the system in order to make it easier to use (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). The resulting “technology 
in practice” (Orlikowsky, 2000) may be quite different from what the system designer intended and 
may lead to counterintuitive results (Gray and Durcikova, 2005-6). Consider the situation where 
organizations permit users to create their own passwords and provide explicit guidance for 
developing strong passwords. Such guidance typically includes requirements to use multiple types of 
characters, to not use words from the dictionary, and to exceed some minimum length. If 
organizations do not monitor or enforce compliance with those guidelines, users tend to ignore them 
and create weak passwords (Zviran and Haga, 1999). If organizations employ password-checking 
programs (Ruffo and Bergadeno, 2005) to monitor and enforce compliance with password guidelines, 
users may resort to behaviors that satisfy the “letter” but not the “spirit” of those rules. For example, 
users may create passwords like !QAZxsw2 or pa$$W0rd. Although both examples appear to satisfy 
typical complexity requirements (i.e., they are case-sensitive and contain both numbers and special 
characters), each may be included in some precompiled dictionaries (the former because it consists 
of a predictable pattern based on the keyboard layout and the latter because it is a regular word, 
albeit with special characters replacing normal letters). Another undesirable user behavior is the 
propensity to use the same password on multiple systems (Ives et al., 2004; Johansson & Riley, 
2005). This creates what is referred to as a “security dependency” or “domino effect” in which 
compromising a weak system provides attackers with authentication credentials for access to other 
more secure systems.  
 
Besides the act of generating a password, using the password during regular logins also takes on an 
adaptive structure. Password authentication systems are designed to restrict access to only those 
people who correctly enter a username and a password. The underlying assumption is that legitimate 
authorized users can successfully meet these requirements. Users, however, often make 
typographical errors or may even forget their passwords altogether. Many systems are designed to 
lock users out after a certain number of failed attempts (usually three to five). Such lockouts not only 
result in extra time and cost spent resolving these problems, but are also likely to cause users to alter 
their behaviors to avoid future problems. For example, if users have difficulty remembering a complex 
password, they may write it down. Alternatively, to avoid typing errors, users may store their password 
or passphrase electronically so that they can simply copy and paste it when authenticating 
themselves to a system. Both responses transform the authentication credential from “something you 
know” to “something you have,” with concomitant unfavorable changes in the effective level of 
security provided.  
 
The preceding examples illustrate how user behaviors can cause the actual level of security provided 
by a specific authentication credential to be much lower than the analysis of its technical 
specifications would predict. They also underscore the need to consider user experience with and 
perceptions about authentication mechanisms. If users have negative perceptions about a system, 
they are less likely to use it voluntarily; or if use is mandatory, users are likely to circumvent or modify 
features that are perceived as too burdensome (Ives et al., 1983; Mahmood et al., 2000; McKeen et 
al., 1994). Thus, the difficulty of use (in the form of login failure rate, for example) is likely to be 
                                                     
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for calling attention to the need for this adjustment in unit of analysis to words. 
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directly associated with user attempts to modify the implementation of an authentication mechanism. 
Consequently, when deciding whether to replace passwords with passphrases, system designers and 























Figure 1. Theoretical model of login failure, user perceptions, and intentions 
 
Login failures by legitimate authorized users can be due to either forgetting the login credential or 
making typographical errors when entering it. Therefore, the relative effectiveness of passwords and 
passphrases depends, in part, on how easy it is to both remember and successfully enter each type 
of credential. Figure 1 displays the theoretical relationships between password characteristics and 
login failure as well as between login failure and the subsequent user perceptions and intentions. The 
following sections discuss these relationships and constructs in greater detail. 
2.1. Memory-related Issues with Authentication Credentials 
In order to truly be an authentication credential that is “something you know,” passwords or 
passphrases must be memorized and not written down. One important factor affecting memorization 
is the ability to retain the to-be-learned information in short-term (or “working”) memory long enough 
to transfer it to long-term memory (Anderson, 2005; Driscoll, 2005, p. 86-87). This transfer depends 
upon the relationship between the amount of information to be learned and the storage capacity of 
short-term memory. Initially, short-term memory was estimated as being capable of holding between 
five to nine “chunks” of information (Miller, 1956), but more recent studies suggest that the effective 
optimal size is actually three to five “chunks” of information (Cowan, 2001; Doumont, 2002). However, 
this is not as stringent a limitation as it may seem because a chunk of information need not be limited 
to a single character or number, but may instead be any meaningful set of related items (Simon, 
1974, p. 482). Thus, both a single word like “baseball” and a phrase like “roses are red, violets are 
blue” may each be treated as one chunk of information, even though the former consists of eight and 
the latter of 31 characters. Consistent with this chunking theory, prior research has indeed found that 
passphrases are as easy to remember as user-generated passwords (Keith et al., 2007; Zviran and 
Haga, 1993).  
 
Because of the ease of cracking passwords based on common words, most organizations require 
user-generated passwords to consist of a mixture of alphanumeric and special characters. To 
facilitate memorization, users often create passwords like “$3Cur!ty” that appear to be random 
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sequences of symbols but in reality are still based on words that can be easily remembered (e.g., by 
substituting the characters $, 3, and ! for the letters s, e, and i in the word “security”). Such memory-
enabling artifices, however, are also known to attackers and can be used to simplify what would 
otherwise be brute-force guessing. Consequently, some organizations mandate the use of system-
generated passwords that consist of truly random sequences of characters. Although such passwords 
(e.g., “8Wk$nP3!”) may be harder to guess or crack, they are also much more difficult to memorize 
because each character will be treated as a separate chunk of information.  
 
Users must both memorize their authentication credentials and be able to recall them correctly when 
attempting to access the system. People can better remember meaningful words and non-words if 
they generated those items themselves as opposed to merely read them (Cameron et al., 2005; 
Jacoby, 1978; Johns and Swanson, 1988; Slamecka and Graf, 1978). This so-called generation effect 
suggests that it should be easier for users to recall self-generated passwords or passphrases than 
system-generated passwords.  
 
There is reason to suspect, however, that self-generated passwords and passphrases may 
themselves differ in ease of recall. People often attempt to use the same or slightly modified 
passwords on different systems in order to reduce the number of different passwords they need to 
remember (Ives et al., 2004). For example, if different systems impose different requirements (e.g., 
length, use of special characters, etc.), users may simply modify a password they already use on a 
system with less stringent requirements (e.g., replacing the letter “I” with the number “1”). Yet, a 
robust finding in memory research, referred to as the “phonological similarity effect” (PSE) (Baddeley, 
1966; Conrad, 1964; Lian et al., 2001), suggests that sets of phonologically similar words are more 
difficult to distinguish and recall than dissimilar words. Thus, although it may be easier to generate 
new passwords that are similar to other passwords, doing so likely makes it more difficult for users to 
recall the correct password later when attempting to authenticate to a particular system. Currently, 
few systems require the use of passphrases. As a consequence, passphrases should be quite 
dissimilar to passwords used to access other systems and, therefore, should be easier to recall. 
 
The preceding discussion leads to the following hypotheses:  
 
H1a:  Users of passphrases will experience fewer login failures due to memory errors than will 
users of either self-generated passwords or system-generated random passwords. 
H1b:  Users of self-generated passwords will experience fewer login failures due to memory 
errors than will users of system-generated random passwords. 
2.2. Typing-related Issues with Authentication Credentials 
People may correctly remember their password or passphrase, but still make a typographical error 
when entering it. This problem is aggravated by the design of human-computer login interface, which 
masks the characters being entered to prevent “over-the-shoulder” password discovery. As a result, 
users do not have the ability to “recognize” that they have made a mistake and to correct it 
immediately (as they can do when using a word processing program). On the contrary, they only 
receive feedback (in the form of a login failure) after they finish entering an invalid password.  
 
Typing is a process that involves four stages (Salthouse, 1986): 1) the input stage where text is 
converted in memory into chunks, 2) the parsing stage where the chunks are decomposed into strings 
of characters, 3) the translation stage where characters are converted in memory to specific finger 
movements, and 4) the execution stage where the key presses are carried out. Although errors can 
occur at any one of these stages (Salthouse, 1986), the latter two are most likely to produce “typos” 
when entering login credentials. The most common problems include substitution errors, which occur 
by accidentally striking a nearby key instead of the correct one; temporal errors, which involve 
transposing correct letters; and execution errors that arise from entering too few or too many 
keystrokes (Logan, 1999).  
 
The probability of making a typing error increases with the amount of material being entered. Thus, 
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one might expect that passphrases, because of their increased length, should result in more typing 
errors than short passwords. Indeed, Keith et al. (2007) report that user-created passphrases were 
more than twice as long as user-generated passwords and resulted in significantly more login failures 
due to typing errors.  
 
Length, however, is only one of many factors that can cause typing errors. It has been argued that 
because of the many potential error factors affecting each key press, “the challenge is more one of 
explaining accuracy rather than errors” (Logan, 1999, p. 1769). One such explanation is offered by 
Rieger (2004), who argues that typists can develop “automatic activation” for common words and 
phrases—meaning that actions can become so learned that the translation stage (that of converting 
letters into keystrokes) can require almost no effort. In other words, typing patterns that have become 
well-learned will result in higher speeds and greater accuracy due to the strengthening of cognitive 
information processing pathways4 during training (Cohen et al., 1990; John, 1996; Rumelhart and 
Norman, 1982). This argument has significant implications for the design of passphrases and 
passwords. Nowadays, most users have considerable word processing experience. Therefore, 
familiar sequences of characters that consist of commonly typed words and that use typical spelling 
and punctuation should be typed much more quickly and accurately than unusual sequences of 
characters that include numbers and special characters. Consequently, security practitioners have 
argued that it is easier to type passphrases than complex passwords that consist of not only 
alphanumeric but also special characters (cf Skoudis and Liston, 2006, p. 402). For example, users 
should make fewer typing errors when entering the word “scooter” than when typing “Sc00ter” or 
“$c00t3r” because the former conforms to normal spelling conventions used when typing a text 
document. We will refer to typing passwords and passphrases consistent with the contents of normal 
text documents as being in “word processing mode” (WPM). 
 
Users are likely to enter into WPM when typing a passphrase because the credential is a sentence or 
sentence fragment. Consequently, passphrases that are similar in structure to what would be typed in 
a word processing document should be easier to type correctly than those that violate normal word 
processing rules, because the former represent a well-learned skill. For example, when numbers are 
included in a passphrase, they are less likely to result in typing errors if they are used as dates or 
ages than if they are appended to or mixed into the words that comprise the passphrase (e.g., 
passphrases like “In 1492 Columbus sailed the ocean blue” or “Bill Jones is 23” should result in fewer 
typing errors than passphrases like “Th1s is my s3cr3t passphrase” or “Once upon a time3”). The use 
of spaces to separate words is also more consistent with WPM and, therefore, should result in fewer 
typing errors than attempting to enter the same phrase either without any spaces or using the 
underscore character to separate words. 
 
Lack of conformity to WPM may explain Keith et al.’s (2007) finding that passphrases increased the 
number of login failures due to typing errors. In their study, users who were assigned to the 
passphrase condition were required to create credentials that were case sensitive and that contained 
at least one non-letter. Our examination of the credentials created by their subjects reveals that most 
participants did not create phrases consistent with WPM. Instead, they either did not use spaces or 
used a special character, such as the underscore, to separate the words in the phrase. Therefore, 
Keith et al.’s (2007) finding that passphrases result in more typing errors may not represent an 
inherent problem with passphrases but, rather, may simply reflect problems associated with creating 
passphrases that are inconsistent with WPM. If people create passphrases that follow normal word 
processing conventions, their well-developed word processing skill should offset the increased length 
and may even make such passphrases less prone to typing errors than user-generated passwords 
comprised of a non-WPM sequence of alphanumeric characters. This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H2a:  Users who create passphrases that conform to word processing mode (WPM) will 
                                                     
4 The term “processing pathways” refers to the pattern of cognitive activities that comprise human actions. For 
example, finger movements occur “via a set of connected modules that form a pathway” (Cohen et al., 1990, p. 335) 
through the brain. The speed and accuracy at which the finger moves depends on the “strength” of the pathway. 
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experience fewer typing errors than will users of either system- or self-generated 
passwords. 
H2b:  Users who create passphrases that conform to WPM will experience fewer typing errors 
than will users who create passphrases that are not consistent with WPM. 
H2c:  Users of system-generated random passwords will experience more typing errors than will 
users who generate their own passwords. 
2.3. User Perceptions of Alternative Authentication Credentials 
In general, people prefer to minimize effort when using systems, provided then achieve an acceptable 
level of accuracy (Todd and Benbasat, 1994; 1999; 2000). At first glance, it would appear that it takes 
more effort to use passphrases than either user-generated or system-generated passwords because 
they are longer and require more keystrokes to enter. However, the preceding sections have 
presented reasons to believe that passphrases may be easier to remember and less prone to typing 
errors than either user-generated or system-generated passwords. Thus, passphrases may actually 
require less effort to use successfully than either user-generated or system-generated passwords. 
 
Moreover, according to the technology acceptance model (Davis, 1989; Adam et al., 1992; Venkatesh 
and Davis, 2000; Wixom and Todd, 2005), if users cannot successfully log in either because they 
make a typographic error or because they forget their password, they are likely to form negative 
perceptions about the “ease of use” and “usefulness” of that credential, and be less satisfied overall. 
Both typing and memory errors are expected to create similar negative perceptions, because the 
design of the login interface only provides feedback that the login attempt was unsuccessful, but does 
not indicate the cause for the login failure. Indeed, the two types of errors can become intertwined 
and hard for users to distinguish. If users experience repeated login failures due to typing errors, they 
may question whether they remember the correct password for that system. If they then enter a 
different password, they will experience additional login failures, thereby further exacerbating their 
perceived ease of use and usefulness about the login credential being used. Hence, the overall login 
failure rate, rather than the cause of the login failure, is likely to determine user perceptions. The 
more frequently users encounter problems when using a credential to attempt to login, the more 
negative their perceptions are likely to become. As a result of negative perceptions, they will have 
lower intentions to voluntarily adopt that credential for future use. This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H3:  Overall login failure rates will be inversely related to perceptions about the ease-of-use and 
usefulness of login credentials. 
H4: User perceptions about the ease-of-use and usefulness of a login credential increase their 
intentions to voluntarily adopt this type of credential for future use. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the variables of interest and how they relate to our hypotheses. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Participants and Task 
We conducted a longitudinal field study to test our hypotheses. Undergraduate students from a large 
public university who were enrolled in an elective course on web development offered by the school 
of business participated in the experiment. Course instructors used a class website to provide 
resources and materials for web design. The site contained a restricted section where assignments, 
materials, and tutorials could be accessed only via username and password. Before classes began, a 
database was generated containing each student’s university-assigned username. Next, each 
username was randomly assigned to one of three groups for password generation requirements: 1) 
Standard, user-generated passwords at least eight characters long and containing one or more non-
letters, 2) Random, system-generated passwords that were eight characters long and created from 
the 95-character base FIPS standard (1985), and 3) User-generated passphrases at least 16 
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Table 1. Theory, Variables, and Hypotheses about Password and Passphrase Use 




The ability to “chunk” information 
makes related letters and words 
easier to remember. Therefore, 
passphrases and user-generated 
passwords that can be represented 
as one chunk are easier to 
remember than system-generated 
passwords, because each random 





H1a: Users of passphrases will 
experience fewer login failures due 




H1b: Users of self-generated 
passwords will experience fewer 
login failures due to memory errors 







1964; Lian et 
al., 2001) 
Multiple “orthogonal” words are 
easier to remember at once than 
highly similar words. Therefore, 
multiple passwords and 
passphrases are easier to 
remember if they are more different 
from others in memory. Because 
passphrases are seldom used at 
the present time, they should differ 
markedly from any passwords 
previously used and, therefore, 





H1a: Users of passphrases will 
experience fewer login failures due 









Those characters that are less 
commonly typed in word 
processing (e.g., numbers and non-
alphanumeric characters) are less 
automatic in terms of motor skills. 
As more of these unusual 
characters are used, passwords 
and passphrases become more 





H2a: Users who create 
passphrases that conform to word 
processing mode (WPM) will 
experience fewer typing errors than 
will users of either system- or self-
generated passwords. 
H2b: Users who create 
passphrases that conform to WPM 
will experience fewer typing errors 
than will users who create 
passphrases that are not consistent 
with WPM. 
H2c: Users of system-generated 
random passwords will experience 
more typing errors than will users 











User experiences with login 
credentials determine their 
subsequent perceptions. In the 
text-based authentication context, 
these measures are based upon 
the user’s rate of login failure, 
which is a function of the rates of 








H3: Overall login failure rates will be 
inversely related to perceptions 
about the ease-of-use and 
usefulness of login credentials.  
 
H4: User perceptions about the 
ease-of-use and usefulness of a 
login credential increase their 
intentions to voluntarily adopt this 
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In the first class, each participant accessed the course’s website registration page and entered his or 
her university username. Depending on the group to which they were randomly assigned, participants 
then received one of three different sets of instructions. The interfaces for each group were identical 
except for the instructions about the nature of the login credential that would be used to access the 
materials on the course website. Participants assigned to the standard group were asked to generate 
a password that was at least eight characters long and contained at least one non-letter. Participants 
assigned to the random group were asked to provide an email address where they would have their 
password sent to them. Participants assigned to the passphrase group were asked to generate a 
password based on a three- to five-word phrase at least 16 characters long.5 Website functionality 
was built in to ensure that the standard and passphrase participants met length and character 
requirements. In addition, participants assigned to the passphrase and standard password groups 
saw a pop-up window that reminded them not to create a login credential that was similar to one they 
used on any other system.  
 
The course included eight homework assignments that could only be obtained by logging into the 
website. These assignments were given at a rate of one per week, leaving six weeks with no login 
requirement toward the semester’s end. During those last six weeks, participants could continue to 
log in to the website to retrieve missed assignments, download lecture slides, and obtain web 
development resources. Every time a participant attempted to log in, the website application recorded 
the username, login credential entered, timestamp, and outcome (success or failure). Participants 
who forgot their passwords had to personally contact the instructor, who then verbally provided them 
with their password. If participants needed a password reminder outside of class hours, they were told 
to call the instructor at a specified phone number or send an email with a phone number at which the 
instructor would call them back.  
3.2. Measures 
Login Failure and Error  
The overall login failure rate, failures due to memory errors, and failures due to typing errors were 
calculated for each individual. Rates of failures were used rather than totals in order to normalize the 
varying numbers of individuals’ login attempts (i.e., participants who have more login failures will 
naturally have higher login totals). Distinguishing between memory-errors and typing-errors was 
accomplished using a hybrid of objective measures and subjective judgments as described below.  
 
Keith et al. (2007) used a formula known as the “Levenshtein” (L) distance (Levenshtein, 1966) to 
distinguish typo- from memory-related errors. The resulting L-score is a measure of the difference in 
the characters between two strings. For example, entering “paswword” instead of “password” results 
in an L-score of 1. The algorithm also accounts for difference in string lengths, so that when 
compared to the correct word “password” both “password," and “passwords” have an L-score of 1.  
 
Incorrectly typing one character results in an L-score of 1. Thus, it is tempting to classify any login 
failure with an L-score of 1 as a typographical error, and any login failure with an L-score greater than 
1 as a memory problem. Although objective, such a rule is inadequate, because it does not take into 
account the context of the login failures. For example, if a user makes only one keystroke error when 
entering his password, then it seems likely that he has simply made a typographical error. On the 
other hand, if the user makes the same one-character mistake several times in a short period, then it 
is more likely that he has, in fact, forgotten the exact spelling of the password. Nonetheless, the L-
scores would be 1 for each such login failure. In addition, the L-score formula does not take into 
account the position of the keystroke error or its context in a word. For example, assume that 
“hairball” is user1’s password and that user1 experiences two separate login failures when entering 
“hairball\” and “hairballs” instead of the correct password. The L-scores for both mistakes would be 1; 
                                                     
5 Because many participants might never have used passphrases before, two examples were provided in the 
instructions. The first example was “Ilovetosnowboard” and the second was “I love to snowboard”. The system 
ensured that participants could not simply copy and paste either of the examples provided. In addition, the 
“remember password” option was disabled during the course of our experiment. 
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consequently, use of the rule that an L-score of 1 represents a typing error would categorize both 
mistakes as typographical errors. The two errors, however, are actually quite different. The “\” 
character is just above the enter key and, therefore, may conceivably have been pressed by accident. 
In contrast, the letter “s” is not next to either the letter “l” or the enter key and, consequently, more 
likely reflects a memory error (i.e., the user forgot whether the password was singular or plural).  
 
Large L-scores are also potentially problematic. A large L-score can represent a memory error, in 
which the user entered the wrong credential for that system. On the other hand, it could also result 
from accidentally pressing the “Caps Lock” key, instead of the shift key when typing the first character 
of the login credential.  
 
Examination of the sequence of login attempts, however, can often provide clues about the cause of a 
login failure. For example, entering a different password after experiencing a login failure suggests 
that the preceding login failure was due to a memory error (i.e., the user forgot which password to use 
on this system). Similarly, responding to a failed login attempt by re-entering the same password but 
typing it correctly is evidence that the previous failure represented a typing error.  
 
The preceding examples demonstrate why it is necessary to use subjective judgment in combination 
with an objective measure like an L-score in order to classify the cause of a login failure. Therefore, 
we asked two judges (neither of whom was aware of the hypotheses being tested) to use both L-
scores and information about the login context to determine the cause of login failures. These judges 
were given a list of every login failure, including the user identification number, that user’s correct 
password or passphrase, incorrect credential entered, L-score, and a timestamp so that they could 
take into account both the context and sequences of login attempts. In addition, we explained the L-
scoring technique to them.    
 
The judges individually categorized each login failure and recorded the reasons for their decisions. 
The two judges then met and compared their individual assessments. They agreed on 92.3 percent of 
the 351 login failures. The Kappa coefficient is 0.775 (p < 0.001), indicating that their agreement rate 
was significantly greater than chance. The judges discussed the cases where they disagreed with 
each other and reached agreement on how to categorize every such login failure. We used the 
consensus classification identified for each login failure as the dependent variable.    
User Perceptions and Intentions 
We measured user perceptions and intentions by administering a survey on the last day of class. 
Each survey item was based on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 7 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). Items measuring ease-of-use and usefulness were based on the dimensions used by 
Adams et al. (1992), with modifications for the password context. We also included single item to 
measure intent to adopt (see Appendix A for the list of survey items). 
4. Experimental Results 
Of the 58 undergraduate students who began the experiment, five (two from each password group 
and one from the passphrase group) dropped the class during the first five weeks. In addition, we 
removed one subject from the passphrase group who did not follow the generation guidelines to 
generate a three of five word phrase from the final analysis, resulting in a sample size of 52 
individuals. This resulted in 18 participants in the standard password group, and 17 participants each 
in the random and passphrase treatments.   
 
Over the course of the semester, the participants attempted 1,540 logins (of which 351 were 
unsuccessful) to the class website, resulting in an average of almost 30 attempts per individual. 
Although a minimum of only eight successful attempts were required to retrieve the eight homework 
assignments, the additional login attempts were a result of both login failures and a desire to access 
the additional web development resources available on the site.  
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4.1. Demographics and Descriptive Data 
Thirty-eight of the 52 participants were male. Forty-two participants were native United States 
Citizens. Thirty participants were students from the school of business where the web development 
course was offered, and the remainder came from the schools of fine arts, liberal arts and sciences, 
and engineering. Of those participants who chose to report their academic standing, there was one 
freshman, two sophomores, 19 juniors, 23 seniors, and four graduate students. The average 
participant age was nearly 24, with a range from 17 to 43. 
 
Table 2 contains descriptive information concerning the authentication credentials for these 52 
participants. The passphrase group’s credential averaged 18.2 characters in length (and 3.63 words) 
compared with 9.7 and 8 characters for the standard and random password groups, respectively. The 
average character base is determined by the presence of lowercase letters, uppercase letters, 
numbers, and non-letters in the password. For example, a password consisting of only lowercase 
letters has a character base of 26; one containing both uppercase and lowercase letters has a 
character base of 52; one that is case sensitive and includes numbers has a character base of 62; 
and one that used all keyboard characters on a standard QWERTY keyboard has a character base of 
95.6  
 









base # of possible combinations 
1. Standard 
Password 18 9.7 1.52 37.1 2.4E+15 
2. Random 
Password 17 8.0 0.00 88.0 3.6E+15 
3. Passphrase 17 18.2 1.69 31.0 9.9E+26 
 
Ave. # of 
lowercas
e letters 
Ave. # of 
uppercas
e letters 
Ave. # of 
numbers
Ave. # of 
spaces 
Ave. # of non-alphanumeric 
characters excluding spaces
1. Standard 
Password 6.9 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.2 
2. Random 
Password 2.3 2.9 0.8 0.0 2.0 
3. Passphrase 16.3 0.2 0.6 2.0 0.0 
 
Table 2 also shows that user-generated passwords were more likely to contain numbers than special 
characters. Passphrases, however, seldom included numbers or any special characters other than 
spaces. We ran a popular password-cracking program called “Ophcrack” for two hours against a 
Windows Vista password hash dump file of the login credentials used in this experiment to evaluate 
their relative strength. We were able to crack 16 of the 18 user-generated passwords, one of the 
system-generated random passwords, but none of the passphrases.7   
 
As a manipulation check, the user perceptions survey administered at the conclusion of the 
experiment included an item asking participants to indicate how similar this password or passphrase 
was to any previous or current passwords they have used. Based on a Likert scale from 1-7 (1 = very 
similar, 7 = very dissimilar), the standard, random, and passphrase groups reported means of 4.50, 
                                                     
6 It can be argued that the mere presence of non-alphanumeric characters does not indicate a “true” 95-character 
base because the 10 characters associated with the number keys on a keyboard are used far more often than the 
other 23 non-alphanumeric characters. While this may be true, the only two user-generated passwords in Table 2 
that we classified as using the full 95-character set both used non-alphanumeric characters not associated with the 
number keys. 
7 As one anonymous reviewer noted, the failure to crack any passphrases may be an artifact of the design of most 
current password cracking programs, which are limited to brute-force guessing of credentials that are less than 15 
characters in length. 
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6.57, and 6.63 respectively, indicating that each group considered their passwords to be different from 
those they used in other settings.  
4.2.. Login Performance 
We performed an analysis of the differences in login performance between groups using one-way 
ANOVAs with credential type as the independent variable and the participant’s login failure rates due 
to memory and typographical errors as dependent variables. We used T-tests to compare the 
hypothesized group differences8 whereas comparisons that were not hypothesized. 
 
 Overall (combining memory and typographical errors), the passphrase group experienced the lowest 
login failure rate (10.98 percent), followed by the standard (20.32 percent) and random (30.15 
percent) groups. Perhaps most interesting, four of the passphrase users never experienced a single 
login failure, compared to only two of the standard password users and one of the random password 
users. 
 
The judges classified 299 of the 351 login failures as reflecting memory errors and 52 as representing 
typographical errors (see Table 3 for group details). We performed multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) using Wilks’s lambda criterion to check for mean differences among the three groups 
across memory and typographical error rates (See Appendix B for details). Results of the MANOVA 
indicated that significant differences exist (F = 4.059, p = 0.004). Therefore, we performed 
independent ANOVAs for each dependent variable (see the results in Appendix C). 
 













Mean 34.17 25.94 7.56 0.67 
Std. Dev. 13.23 8.62 9.50 0.91 
2. Random 
Password 
Mean 29.71 20.00 8.12 1.59 
Std. Dev. 11.85 8.14 6.57 1.18 
3. Passphrase Mean 24.71 22.47 1.47 0.76 
Std. Dev. 12.68 11.73 1.33 1.15 
Memory Errors 
Figure 3 shows that the passphrase group experienced significantly fewer memory errors (7.80 
percent) than either the standard group (18.22 percent, p = .017) or the random group (24.78 percent, 
p < .001). Thus, H1a is supported. However, the standard and random groups did not differ 
significantly in the number of login failures due to memory errors (p = .124). Thus, H1b is not 
supported.  
Typographical Errors 
Hypothesis H2a predicts that users who created WPM-consistent passphrases would make fewer 
typing errors than would users of either self-generated or system-generated random passwords. Four 
participants created passphrases that were not consistent with WPM. Therefore, we tested H2a by 
excluding those four participants from the analysis. Figure 4 shows that the typographical error rate 
for the 13 passphrase users who created WPM-consistent passphrases was 2.34 percent, which was 
significantly lower than the typing error rate for the random group (5.36 percent, t = 1.927, p = .032). 
The difference in typing error rates between the passphrase and standard password groups, however, 
was not significant (means of 2.34 percent vs. 2.11% percent t = 0.185, p = .854). Thus, H2a is only 
partially supported.  
                                                     
8 Levene’s test was used to measure the homogeneity of variances and t-test adjustments. Only one pairwise 
comparison did not pass the Levene test for the homogeneity of variances (p > .05); hence the corresponding t-test 
for that comparison was performed assuming unequal variances. 
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Figure 3: Average Rate of Memory Errors by Group 
 
 
Figure 4: Average Rate of Typographical Errors by Group 
Note: This graph and corresponding ANOVA does not include passphrase users who did not 
conform to WPM 
 
H2b predicts that the degree to which passphrases are WPM-consistent affects the likelihood of 
making a typographical error. Sample size constraints prevented us from creating two passphrase 
groups in this study. Therefore, to test H2b, we obtained the data from the passphrase group in Keith 
et al.’s (2007) experiment. Their passphrase group received similar instructions with the exception 
that their subjects were required to include at least one non-alphabetic character, one upper-case 
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letter, and one lower-case letter. The two passphrase groups are of the same size (n = 17) and 
created passphrases of similar length (means of 18.06 characters in that study vs. 18.12 characters 
in this study, t = 0.065, p = 0.949).   
 
To test H2b, we grouped the 34 individual passphrases created in both studies into those that 
conformed to WPM (e.g., use of spaces, no alternative characters, etc.) and those that did not. This 
classification resulted in 18 participants in the WPM group (13 from the current study and five from 
Keith et al. (2007)) and 16 in the non-WPM group (four from the current study and 12 from Keith et al. 
(2007)). The same judges who coded the cause of login errors for participants in this study followed 
the same procedures to classify the cause of login errors in the data from Keith et al. (2007). One-
tailed t-tests reveal that the typing error rate was lower for passphrases that were consistent with 
WPM (3.19% vs. 8.29%, p = 0.019). Thus, H2b is supported.9 Figure 4 also shows that H2c is 
supported: users of system-generated random passwords made significantly more typographical 
errors than did users of self-generated passwords (5.36 percent vs. 2.11 percent, p =.007). 
 
Collectively, the results of testing Hypotheses H2a-c indicate that users of WPM-consistent 
credentials made fewer typographical errors than did users of credentials that were not WPM-
consistent. To further examine this issue, we performed a regression analysis of the rate of 
typographical errors as a function of the types of characters included in the login credential. The 
analysis contained in Appendix D shows that the only factor significantly associated with the rate of 
typographical errors was the inclusion of non-alphanumeric characters (other than spaces). This 
provides additional evidence in support of the WPM effect. It also explains the results of testing 
Hypotheses H2a-c: as shown in Table 2, system-generated random passwords included an average 
of two such non-alphanumeric characters, but self-generated passwords (passphrases) seldom 
(never) used any such characters.   
4.3. User Perceptions 
At the end of the project, participants completed the perceptions survey (shown in Appendix A) during 
the final class period. Although the items were based on validated instruments, they were adjusted for 
the specific context of passphrase usage. The three items measuring ease-of-use formed a reliable 
construct (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90). However, the item concerning credential “effectiveness” was 
removed in order to achieve a reliable, four-item measure of usefulness (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92). 
Figure 5 displays the differences between groups on all three perception measures: ease-of-use, 
usefulness, and intent to adopt.  
 
Hypothesis H3 predicts that overall login failure rates will affect user perceptions of usefulness and 
ease-of-use. To test these hypotheses, we formulated a partial least squares (PLS) model using 
SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005). Figure 6 displays the PLS model, which confirms H3 that the rate of 
overall login failures is inversely related to both ease-of-use (β = -0.29, p < 0.01) and usefulness (β = 
-0.14, p < 0.05). 
 
Hypothesis H4 predicts that user perceptions will affect their intent to voluntarily adopt a particular 
type of login credential for use on other systems. In addition, prior research on technology 
acceptance has demonstrated that perceived usefulness also mediates the relationship between 
perceived ease-of-use and the intention to adopt (Venkatesh and Davis, 1996). The PLS model 
confirmed that perceived ease-of-use is a significant indicator of perceived usefulness (β = 0.77, p < 
0.001) and that perceived usefulness is positively related to a participant’s intention to adopt his or 
her login credential (β = 0.58, p < 0.001). However, the coefficient for the relationship between 
perceived ease-of-use and intention to adopt was not significant. This result is not surprising, 
because prior research has often demonstrated that usefulness is the stronger predictor of a user’s 
intention to adopt because of the mediating effect of usefulness10 (Taylor and Todd, 1995; Venkatesh 
and Davis, 1996; 2000).  
                                                     
9 There was no difference in the rates of memory errors associated with the two types of passphrases (13.44 percent 
for the WPM vs. 10.10 percent for the non-WPM groups, p = 0.547). This is consistent with arguments that any 
amount of meaningfully related information can be represented as a single chunk (Simon, 1974). 
10 However, it is possible that this study simply did not have a large enough sample size to detect the small effect of 
perceived ease of use on intent to adopt. 
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Figure 6: PLS Model Testing H3 and H4 
5. Discussion 
Table 5 summarizes our findings. As predicted, passphrases are easier to remember (i.e., resulted in 
fewer login failures due to memory errors) than either user-generated standard passwords or system-
generated random passwords. Contrary to prior research (cf Yan et al., 2004), we did not find that 
user-generated passwords were easier to remember than system-generated random passwords, but 
they did result in fewer login failures due to typographical errors. The hypotheses concerning the 
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effect of WPM on typographical errors were mostly supported. Users of system-generated random 
passwords, which contained not only alphanumeric but also other special characters, experienced 
more login failures due to typographic errors than did users of standard passwords or users of WPM-
consistent passphrases. In addition, users of WPM-consistent passphrases experienced fewer login 
failures due to typographical errors than did users of passphrases that were not WPM-consistent. 
There was, however, no difference in frequency of typographical errors between passphrases and 
standard passwords. As anticipated, user perceptions were more favorable when they did not 
encounter problems logging in. The relative level of participants’ perceptions was directly related to 
their overall login failure rates, with passphrase users having the most favorable perceptions and 
random password users reporting the least favorable perceptions. Finally, user perceptions about 
usefulness were positively related to their expressed intention to voluntarily adopt that type of 
credential to authenticate themselves to other systems. 
 
Table 5. Summary of Research Findings 
Behavioral Effects 
H1a: Users of passphrases will experience fewer login failures due to memory 
errors than will users of either self-generated passwords or system-generated 
random passwords.  
Supported
H1b: Users of self-generated passwords will experience fewer login failures 
due to memory errors than will users of system-generated random passwords. 
 Not 
Supported
H2a: Users who create passphrases that conform to word processing mode 




H2b: Users who create passphrases that conform to WPM will experience 
fewer typing errors than will users who create passphrases that are not 
consistent with WPM. 
Supported
H2c: Users of system-generated random passwords will experience more 
typing errors than will users who generate their own passwords.  
Supported
Psychological Effects 
H3: Overall login failure rates will be inversely related to perceptions about the 
ease-of-use and usefulness of login credentials.  
Supported
H4: User perceptions about the ease-of-use and usefulness of a login 
credential increase their intentions to voluntarily adopt that type of credential 
for use in authenticating to other systems. 
Supported
5.1. Limitations 
Before discussing the implications of our findings, it is important to consider the limitations of this 
study. First, we conducted a controlled experiment with college students as participants. Controlled 
experiments increase internal validity, but raise questions about external validity. Thus, it is possible 
that our participants’ behavior may not generalize to that of employees in a work setting. One 
difference concerns frequency of logins. Employees must log in at least once each day, and 
sometimes more often (e.g., if password-protected screen savers are used or if policies require 
logging out prior to extended breaks). In contrast, participants in our study only needed to log in 
periodically, perhaps as infrequently as once per week. However, participants in our study were 
required to use their authentication credentials in a meaningful setting to perform a task for which 
there were non-trivial rewards (i.e., they could only complete the assigned homework by successfully 
logging in to the course website). Moreover, we measured actual login behavior, rather than tested 
responses to hypothetical situations.  
 
A second limitation is that the length of our experiment was too short to study the effects of mandatory 
password changes across different types of authentication credentials. Therefore, our results may 
only be representative of the initial use of passphrases as an authentication credential. However, this 
study did utilize a long enough time period to reliably measure whether users can remember and 
correctly enter long passphrases, and hence it represents a significant step forward from the short-
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term and cross-sectional tests used in most prior password research. Nevertheless, future research is 
needed to determine how difficult it is to generate new passphrases, and how a mandatory 
requirement to periodically change passphrases affects subsequent login failure rates and user 
perceptions.  
5.2. Implications 
The findings of this study have a number of important implications for practice and research.  
Practice 
In recent years security practitioners have begun advocating the use of passphrases over passwords. 
One argument in favor of passphrases is that they are easier to remember (cf Johansson and Riley, 
2005, p. 338). Our finding that passphrase users experienced fewer login failures due to memory 
errors supports that argument. This suggests that switching to passphrases may improve security by 
reducing users’ inclination to write them down, thus ensuring that the credential remains “something 
they know.” Our finding that passphrase users made significantly fewer typographical errors than did 
users of system-generated random passwords also supports practitioners’ arguments that it should be 
easier to correctly type passphrases than complex passwords that include special non-alphanumeric 
characters other than spaces (cf Skoudis and Liston, 2006, p. 402).  
 
Our results also suggest that passphrase design is important. Specifically, users of WPM-consistent 
passphrases made fewer typographical errors than did users who created passphrases that were not 
consistent with WPM. This finding suggests that IT managers may wish to strongly encourage users 
to create passphrases that are WPM-consistent so as to help reduce login failures due to 
typographical errors. The ease of typing WPM-consistent passphrases has additional implications for 
IT managers who desire to increase the resistance of passphrases to brute-force attacks by including 
numbers and special characters. Our findings suggest that this intent will be easier to achieve and 
more successful if users choose symbols normally used in word processing (e.g., commas, periods, 
quotes, exclamation points, question marks, etc.). In addition, numbers are more likely to be correctly 
entered if they represent dates, quantities, or ages. Thus, our results suggest that it is better to use 
passphrases verbatim than to create a password consisting of the first letter of each word in the 
phrase because, in most cases, the resulting password will not conform to standard spelling rules.  
A potential problem with adopting passphrase policies is that users may tend to generate 
passphrases consisting of only a small number of words. If we accept conservative estimates that the 
average person’s vocabulary consists of approximately 3,000 words, then the potential search space 
for passphrases that consist of four words is actually smaller and, therefore, easier to “guess” through 
brute-force enumeration, than the search space for eight-character alphanumeric, case-sensitive 
passwords. On the other hand, five-word passphrases drawn from a 3,000 word vocabulary have a 
search space that is larger than that for system-generated random passwords that contain not only 
alphanumeric but also special characters (30005 > 958), and an eight-word passphrase constructed 
from such a vocabulary has a search space comparable to that of a 14-character system-generated 
random password (30008 ~ 9514). Thus, IT managers contemplating the use of passphrases may wish 
to establish a minimum requirement that passphrases consist of at least five words. 
Research 
Our results suggest a number of promising avenues for further research. One important topic 
concerns identifying the reasons why passphrases are easier to remember than user-generated 
passwords. The concepts of chunking and phonological similarity provide competing explanations of 
this phenomenon. On the one hand, a passphrase, regardless of length, may be easy to memorize 
because it can be represented as one chunk. In contrast, a user-generated password that conforms 
to complexity requirements may be represented as multiple chunks: one for the base word, and one 
for each substitution of a number or special character for a letter. Thus, the password $3cur!ty may 
consist of four chunks (i.e., security, $, 3, and !). On the other hand, psychology research has found 
that recall accuracy is inversely related to the degree to which the target item is phonologically similar 
to other items stored in memory (Baddeley, 1966, Conrad, 1964; Lian et al., 2001). Thus, our finding 
that passphrases are easier to remember may merely reflect their novelty and may disappear over 
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time as they become more widely used. Only future research can disentangle these alternative 
explanations. 
 
We did not find a significant difference in typing errors between passphrases and user-generated 
passwords, even though the latter were not WPM-consistent when they included at least one non-
alphabetic character. However, users of self-generated passwords rated their passwords as being 
more similar to the credentials they used on other systems than did passphrase users (4.50 vs. 6.63 
on a 7-point Likert scale, p=0.002). This means that users of self-generated passwords in our study 
had prior practice in typing passwords that were not WPM-consistent. Practice improves the 
performance of cognitive, perceptual, and motor tasks, assuming that individuals are motivated and 
receive immediate feedback (Ericsson et al., 1993). Users in our study were motivated to successfully 
log in as they were trying to access course materials, and they received immediate feedback 
concerning that endeavor. Thus, with practice, users may become proficient in typing short passwords 
that are not WPM-consistent. Nevertheless, while typing error rates in both this study and Keith et al. 
(2007) declined over time during the course of the experiment, the groups that initially experienced 
the highest typing error rates formed the most unfavorable perceptions. Thus, further research 
investigating the effects of password and passphrase composition on typing errors is warranted.  
 
Our finding that WPM-consistent passphrases were less prone to typing errors than non-compliant 
passphrases has implications for the potential strength of passphrases. Current password cracking 
programs focus on manipulating individual characters in the credential, and those character 
manipulation techniques are not optimized for cracking passphrases. Information security like national 
defense, however, is an ongoing process of continual innovation both offensively and defensively. As 
passphrases become more widely used, brute-force methods for attacking them are also likely to 
evolve to focus on manipulating words rather than individual characters, thus significantly weakening 
the potential strength of passphrases. Obvious countermeasures include deliberately misspelling 
words in the phrase or replacing some individual letters with numbers or other special characters. Our 
results suggest, however, that either strategy is likely to increase login failures due to typing errors. 
Therefore, additional research identifying ways to increase passphrase strength without sacrificing 
usability is needed. 
6. Conclusion 
Passphrases, like all authentication credentials, are artifacts. It is important for IS researchers to 
carefully examine and rigorously demonstrate the utility of such artifacts (Hevner et al., 2004). This 
paper does so by showing how technical features (e.g., password composition requirements) and 
reactive behaviors (e.g., memory and typing errors) are so intertwined that focusing on one side of 
the issue but ignoring the other leads to incomplete, or even erroneous, conclusions. Our results 
suggest that passphrases do enhance the usability of including “something you know” as an 
authentication credential. Nevertheless, additional questions remain to be answered by future 
research. 
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Appendix A: Survey Items 
 
Likert Scale 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree 
Similarity 1. The password or passphrase I used for the [experiment]11 is quite similar to 
others I have used in the past or are currently using. 
Ease of Use 2. It would be easy for me to remember passwords like the one I used for [the 
experiment] as a login credential on other restricted sites that I regularly access. 
3. It would be easy for me to correctly enter passwords like the one I created for 
[the experiment] as a login credential on other restricted sites that I regularly 
access. 
4. It would be easy for me to become skillful at generating passwords in the 
format I used for [the experiment] (i.e. length, character set, and composition) as 
a login credential on other restricted sites that I regularly access. 
Usefulness 5. I can enter passwords during routine logins more quickly by using the format of 
my [experiment] password (i.e. length and character set, and composition). 
6. The password I created for [the experiment] would be very difficult for an 
unauthorized user to crack or discover. 
7. Using a password format like the one I used for [the experiment] would help 
reduce my need for password reminders or changes. 
8. I would not need to write down or store my passwords as much if I always 
used a password format (i.e. length and character set, and composition) like the 
one I used for [the experiment] 
9. I could remember more passwords at once if I always used a password format 
(i.e. length, character set, composition) like the one I used for [the experiment] 
Intent to 
Adopt 
10. I intend to use the same password format I used for [the experiment] (i.e. 
length, character set, and composition) in the future to create passwords to login 
to other systems. 
                                                     
11 In the survey instrument the course name appeared in place of the phrase [the experiment]  
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Appendix B: MANOVA Results on the Effect of Credential Type on 
Memory and Typographical Error Rates 
 
Multivariate Tests 
Effect   Value F 
Hyp. 





Intercept Pillai's Trace .683 51.605 2.000 48.000 .000 .683 1.000 
  Wilks' Lambda .317 51.605 2.000 48.000 .000 .683 1.000 
  Hotelling's Trace 2.150 51.605 2.000 48.000 .000 .683 1.000 
  Roy's Largest 
Root 2.150 51.605 2.000 48.000 .000 .683 1.000 
CredTyp
e 
Pillai's Trace .282 4.026 4.000 98.000 .005 .141 .899 
  Wilks' Lambda .732 4.059 4.000 96.000 .004 .145 .901 
  Hotelling's Trace .348 4.087 4.000 94.000 .004 .148 .903 
  Roy's Largest 
Root .280 6.855 2.000 49.000 .002 .219 .905 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 












Rate of Memory 
Errors  .250 2 .125 5.868 .005 .193 .854 
  Rate of Typo Errors  
.010 2 .005 2.756 .073 .101 .519 
Intercept Rate of Memory 
Errors  1.490 1 1.490 70.062 .000 .588 1.000 
  Rate of Typo Errors  
.066 1 .066 37.791 .000 .435 1.000 
Credentia
l Type  
Rate of Memory 
Errors  .250 2 .125 5.868 .005 .193 .854 
  Rate of Typo Errors  
.010 2 .005 2.756 .073 .101 .519 
Error Rate of Memory 
Errors  1.042 49 .021      
  Rate of Typo Errors  
.085 49 .002      
Total Rate of Memory 
Errors  2.787 52       
  Rate of Typo Errors  
.159 52       
Corrected 
Total 
Rate of Memory 
Errors  1.292 51       
  Rate of Typo Errors  
.095 51       
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Appendix C: ANOVAs Comparing Credential Types 
 








Power   
(α = .05) 
Between Groups 0.250 2 0.125 5.868 0.005 0.193 0.854 
Within Groups 1.042 49 0.021     
Total 1.292 51           
 
 
 Cell means for memory errors by credential type 
 Credential 
 Type Mean Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Standard .182 .034 .113 .251 
 Random .248 .035 .177 .319 
 Passphrase .078 .035 .007 .149 
 
 










Between Groups 0.011 2 0.005 3.816 0.029 0.145 0.664 
Within Groups 0.065 45 0.001     
Total 0.076 47           
 
 
Cell means for typographical errors by credential type 
 Credential 
 Type Mean Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Standard .021 .010 .001 .041 
 Random .054 .010 .033 .074 
 Passphrase .032 .010 .012 .052 
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Appendix D: Regression Models Predicting Typographical Errors 
 
Linear regression was used to further understand the effects of password length and specific 
character types on typographical errors. The results indicate that password and passphrase length 
did not explain any of the variance in typo errors in this study. Neither did the amount of uppercase 
letters or numbers. However, the inclusion of non-alphanumeric characters (e.g., #, @, and &) did 
have a significant effect on the rate of typo errors (p < .001). None of the passphrases used these 
characters, but they did appear in all but one of the system-generated passwords and also in two of 
the user-created passwords. The resulting credential is not WPM-consistent, which may account for 
the fact that the random group had the highest rate of typing errors, as predicted by the rationale 
underlying H2a and H2b. 
 
Regression Model Estimates for 
Typographical Errors 
Independent Variable Model 
Password Length 0.001 
 (0.764) 
Rate of 'Other Characters' 0.168*** 
 (3.419) 
Rate of Uppercase 
Letters -0.026 
 (-0.580) 
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